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Abstract 
The classic dual economy models of developing countries hold minimum wages (among other 
institutions) accountable for persistent dualism.  They note that applying or enforcing minimum wage 
laws in only one sector of the economy will create wage differentials which will not be eroded with labor 
mobility to the high wage sector. In this paper we use 12 years of micro data on thousands workers living 
in Costa Rica to test whether legal minimum wages have a differential impact on the wages of workers in 
the formal sector vs. informal sector, defined in various ways in accordance with the dual development 
models.  The evidence from Costa Rica is contrary to the assumptions of these models. We find that 
increases in minimum wages not only raise the wages of workers in the urban formal sector (large urban 
enterprises) who are covered by minimum wage law, but they also increase the wages of all other workers 
covered by minimum wage legislation in what are traditionally regarded as informal sectors and where 
the legislation is often considered not to be enforced.  Specifically, we provide evidence that minimum 
wages increase the wages of workers in small urban enterprises, large rural enterprises and small rural 
enterprises.  Further, our results suggest that higher legal minimum wages raise the average wage of 
workers in these “informal” sectors more than in the urban formal sector. We concluded that in Costa 
Rica minimum wages are being enforced in the rural and small scale sectors and may actually work to 
reduce average wage differentials between these sectors and the urban formal sector.  On the other hand, 
minimum wages have no significant impact on the wages of workers in another sector that is regarded as 
informal but which is not covered by minimum wage legislation: the self-employed workers (both urban 
and rural).  Thus, one could argue that minimum wages may contribute to dualism between the formal 
and informal, defined as self-employed vs. salaried workers.  However, we find no evidence of the 
bleaker scenario, that self-employed earnings are being lowered by minimum wages. 
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I. Introduction 
 
  The degree to which legal minimum wages in developing countries have a real impact on 
the wages of workers in those countries is of substantial interest to policy analysts and policy 
makers in both developing and developed countries.   Legal minimum wages have the potential 
to reduce the level of poverty within developing countries (Freeman, 1993; McLeod and Lustig, 
1997).  However, if minimum wages are enforced only in the relatively high-wage urban formal 
sector, they are unlikely to help workers in the parts of the economy where most of the poor are 
found (the rural and urban informal sectors). Compared to the developed economies, minimum 
wages in developing economies tend to be set at higher levels relative to the average wages.  
Some have worried that these high minimum wages may result in substantial disemployment 
effects in the formal sector, pushing workers into lower-paid informal sectors and suppressing 
wages further in that sector (World Bank, 1990, p.63).   From the point of view of unions in the 
developed economies, the low level of legal minimum wages in developing countries compared 
to those in the developed economies constitutes an unfair advantage in international trade.  This 
has led these groups to push for including legal minimum wage targets in bilateral and 
multilateral trade agreements (Harrison and Leamer, 1997). The degree to which all of these 
points of view are good representations of reality depends, in part, on the degree to which legal 
minimum wages have a real impact on the wages of workers, and on which sectors of the labor 
market are likely to be affected by legal minimum wages.
1  We address these issues in this paper. 
  The literature on legal minimum wages in developing economies generally assumes that 
minimum wages are likely to be enforced only in larger firms and among unionized workers in 
the urban formal sector, and enforced weakly or not at all in the rural or urban informal sectors.
2 
Indeed, this differential enforcement of legal minimum wages is often cited as a key reason for 
the existence of dualistic or segmented labor markets in developing economies.  The classic 
articles on the dualistic nature of developing economies cite differential enforcement of 
minimum wages as a reason for this dualism.   For example, Lewis (1954) divides developing 
economies into a rural informal sector and an urban formal sector.  The structure of the labor 
                                                 
1 For example, Harrison and Leamer (1997) present a general equilibrium model of the impact of minimum wages 
in developing economies which includes the possibility of non-compliance with minimum wages.  In this model an 
increase in minimum wages in developing economies may not improve the competitiveness of developed economy 
industries if developing country firms can shift employment to uncovered sector (informal sector) workers. 
 
2 See Watanabe, 1976 for an early discussion of this issue and Maloney and Nunez (2002) for a more recent paper 
with the same assumption.   3
market is crucial to the dualistic nature of developing economies in the Lewis model and a key 
characteristic of the Lewis model is that wages in the urban formal sector are higher than in the 
rural informal sector.  Ranis and Fei (1961) note that the persistence of an urban/rural wage gap 
as assumed by Lewis must be "sustained by institutional or nonmarket forces since under 
competitive assumptions real wages [in the formal sector] would fall to zero, at equality with the 
MPP [the marginal physical product in agriculture]" (p.536.)   Harris and Todaro (1970) also 
ascribe the urban/rural wage gap to "the existence of a politically determined minimum urban 
wage at levels substantially higher than agricultural earnings" (p.126.)  Fields (1975) extends the 
concept of economic dualism to the urban sector, arguing that differential enforcement of legal 
minimum wages can lead to an institutionally-determined high wage in the urban formal sector 
and a lower competitive wage in the urban informal sector.  As Ranis and Stewart (1999, p. 260) 
put it, "In most less developed countries (LDCs), governments with limited administrative 
resources tend to focus on large-scale operations when trying to collect taxes or enforcement of 
minimum wage legislation." 
In this paper, we first ask whether legal minimum wages have a significant impact on the 
wages paid to workers in the developing economy of Costa Rica and then we examine the 
relationship between the legal minimum wage and economic dualism.  In particular, we examine 
whether the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that legal minimum wages are enforced in 
the formal sector but not in the informal sectors in Costa Rica.  We divide the labor market into 
five sectors: an urban formal sector (urban employees in large firms), three sectors often 
considered "informal" but where legal minimum wages are legally applicable in Costa Rica 
(urban employees in small firms, rural employees in large enterprises and rural employees in 
small enterprises), and an informal sector where legal minimum wages are not legally applicable 
(self-employed workers.)  If legal minimum wages are enforced only in the urban formal sector 
and hence are a cause of dualism between urban and rural sectors, or between large and small 
firms, we would expect to find that higher minimum wages result in higher wages in the urban 
formal sector but do not raise the wages of workers in the rural sector or in small firms (even 
though legal minimum wages are legally applicable to these workers).  On the other hand, if 
legal minimum wages are enforced in all sectors where they are legally applicable, we would 
expect to find that higher legal minimum wages result in higher wages for all types of employees 
covered by minimum wage law, whether they work in large firms, small firms or in rural areas.  
Furthermore, in this case we would expect higher minimum wages to have a larger impact on the 
wages of workers in those sectors with lower average wages and more workers earning near the   4
minimum wage.  That is, we would expect higher minimum wages to have a larger effect on the 
wages of workers in the rural sector and in small firms than in the urban formal sector.  Finally, 
the minimum wage could also cause dualism between the sector that is covered by minimum 
wage law and the informal sector where the minimum wage is not legally applicable (the self-
employed).  
Our paper contributes to the literature that examines the indirect impact of institutions 
and regulations in the formal labor market on the informal labor market, a topic that Harrison 
and Leamer (1997) have identified as a gap in the literature.  To examine these issues, we use 
data from Costa Rica, a developing economy with a complex legal minimum wage structure.  In 
Costa Rica legal minimum wages are set separately for a large number of occupations, although 
within occupations legal minimum wages apply to all employees  irrespective of whether they 
work in a rural or urban area, in large or small firms, part-time, or full-time.  There were 
important changes in the structure of minimum wages in Costa Rica during the period that we 
study.  Whereas at one point there were over 500 wages set by industry and occupational 
categories, from 1988 to 1999 the structure of minimum wages was greatly simplified such that 
today there are only 19 minimum wages, set by skill level. An aspect of the Costa Rica minimum 
wage structure which makes it valuable for research is that these changes in the structure of 
minimum wages over the 1988-1999 period resulted in variation over time and within 
occupations in the minimum wages that were exogenous to changes in the labor market.   
Because we use these frequent (at least once a year) exogenous variations to estimate the impact 
of minimum wages on wages, unlike most previous studies, our results do not suffer from 
potential endogeneity bias.  
In this paper, we make use of the entire set of multiple legal minimum wages at each 
point to estimate the impact of legal minimum wages on the wages of workers. Multiple 
minimum wages are not uncommon in Latin America.  In Mexico, for example, legal minimum 
wages are set separately for three regions and 88 occupations.  It is surprising, therefore, that our 
work (this paper and Gindling and Terrell, 2004) are the only studies that we know of that fully 
take into account this complex minimum wage structure in examining the impact of minimum 
wages on wages and employment in Latin America.  Most published empirical analyses of the 
impact of legal minimum wages in Latin America make the simplifying assumption that the only 
one minimum wage (generally the lowest legal minimum wage for all regions and occupations) 
applies to all workers, regardless of occupation.   5
  Using annual data from Costa Rican Household Surveys for the 1988-1999 period, we 
find that increases in minimum wages not only raise the wages of workers in the urban formal 
sector (large urban enterprises) who are covered by minimum wage law, but they also increase 
the wages of all other workers covered by minimum wage legislation in what are traditionally 
regarded as informal sectors and where the legislation is often considered not to be enforced.   
Specifically, we provide evidence that minimum wages increase the wages of workers in small 
urban enterprises, large rural enterprises and small rural enterprises.  Further, our results suggest 
that higher legal minimum wages raise the average wage of workers in these “informal” sectors 
more than in the urban formal sector. We concluded that in Costa Rica minimum wages are 
being enforced in the rural and small scale sectors and may actually work to reduce wage 
differentials between these sectors and the urban formal sector.  On the other hand, minimum 
wages have no significant impact on the wages of workers in another sector that is regarded as 
informal but which is not covered by minimum wage legislation: the self-employed workers 
(both urban and rural).  Thus, one could argue that minimum wages may contribute to dualism 
between the formal and informal, defined as self-employed vs. salaried workers.  However, we 
find no evidence of the bleaker scenario, that self-employed earnings are being lowered by 
minimum wages. 
 
II. Literature Review 
  The literature on the on the impact of legal minimum wages on the wages of workers in 
developing countries is sparse and the evidence is almost entirely on the effect for workers in the 
formal sector.
3 Recently a number of studies have appeared, many using data for Latin American 
countries. Collectively they indicate that although enforcement is not stringent, minimum wages 
are having a positive effect on wages of  workers in the formal sector.  
  Several studies examine this issue by looking for spikes in the distribution of wages at or 
near the legal minimum wage.  Here the evidence is mixed for studies of Latin American 
countries. Bell (1997) finds a spike in the distribution of wages that corresponds to the minimum 
wage in Colombia but not in Mexico.  She concludes that minimum wages have "virtually no 
impact on the distribution of average wages reported by firms in Mexico" (p.S109) but do have 
an effect on the wages of workers in Colombia.   Fajnzylber (2001) and Lemos (2002) find 
spikes in the distribution of wages near the minimum wage in Brazil.   Maloney, et al. (2002)   6
find spikes at the minimum wage for workers in the formal sector in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Brazil, and Honduras but not in Argentina, Mexico or Uruguay. Castillo-Freeman and Freeman 
(1992) find a significant spike in the distribution of wages at the minimum wage in Puerto Rico. 
Strobl and Walsh (2003) also find some evidence that with the introduction of the minimum 
wage the largest spike in the distribution of wages moved up the distribution towards the 
minimum wage in Trinidad and Tobago. 
  The evidence using more traditional econometric techniques is also mixed.  Bell (1997) 
uses time-series data to regress the log of manufacturing wages on the log of minimum wages, 
the log of real GNP for Mexico and Colombia.  She finds that minimum wages do not have a 
significant impact on wages in Mexico, but do have a significant impact (with an elasticity of 
0.37) in Colombia.
4   Rama (2001), who examines the consequences of doubling the minimum 
wage in Indonesia, finds that this 100% change in the minimum wage increased average wages 
by 5-15%. 
  Neither Bell nor Rama estimate the impact of legal minimum wages on the wages of 
workers separately for the formal the informal sectors, whereas Maloney and Nunez (2002) and 
Fajnzylber (2001) use panel data from Colombia and Brazil (respectively) to estimate the impact 
of legal minimum wages on the wages of workers in both the formal and informal sectors.  
Maloney and Nunez (2002) define the informal sector as the self-employed while Fajnzylber 
(2001) presents estimates for two definitions of the informal sector: self-employed and 
unregistered employees.   Both of these studies find large significant effects of minimum wages 
on wages of formal sector employees initially earning within 10% above or below the minimum 
wage:  Maloney and Nunez (2002) report an elasticity of 0.6 for workers with initial wages near 
the minimum wage in Colombia, while Fajnzylber (2001) report an elasticity of 1.08 in Brazil.
5  
With respect to the impact on workers in the informal sector, Maloney and Nunez find that 
minimum wages do not have a significant effect on the wages of self-employed workers near the 
minimum wage.  Fajnzylber finds that the impact on the wages of informal sector workers is not 
only significant, but also larger than the impact on formal sector workers: he estimate an 
elasticity of 1.03 for unregistered paid employees and 1.32 for self-employed workers.   
                                                                                                                                                             
3 In this section we review the literature on the impact of legal minimum wages on wages.  We do not review articles 
that only estimate the impact of legal minimum wages on employment without first estimating the impact on wages  
4 Bell (1997) also estimates time-series equations that include lagged wages as an independent variable.  In this 
specification, minimum wages do not have a significant effect on wages in either Colombia or Mexico. 
5 This implies that a 1% increase in minimum wages raises the wages of paid employees by more than 1%., which 
strikes us as large and makes us question whether the minimum wage variable is not picking up other factors which 
affect both minimum wages and wages.   7
Fajnzylber argues that even though it is assumed that legal minimum wages are not applicable to 
the informal sector, the positive wage effect represents a “lighthouse effect” whereby informal 
sector workers set their wages by referring to the legal minimum wage.  An alternative 
explanation for the large wage effects in the formal and informal sector found by Maloney and 
Nunez and Fajnzylber is that the changes in legal minimum wages and changes in wages over 
time may both be driven by the same unmeasured phenomenon.    
  Strobl and Walsh (2003) use panel data to estimate whether the minimum wage affected 
the probability that a worker initially earning below the minimum wage earned above the 
minimum wage after the introduction of the national minimum wage in Trinidad and Tobago in 
1998.   They argue that the introduction of a national minimum wage in Trinidad and Tobago 
was largely unanticipated, and “can be argued to be at least weakly exogenous” (p. 428).  They 
find that the minimum wage increased the probability that a low-wage worker earns at least the 
minimum wage by about 20%.  They also find this effect is bigger for workers in large firms (10 
or more employees) compared to small firms. 
  We will argue below that changes in the structure of minimum wages in Costa Rica result 
in variation in the minimum wages, over time and within occupations, that were exogenous to 
changes in the labor market.  Therefore, the results presented in our present paper do not suffer 
from the potential endogeneity bias that may be driving the results in the Maloney and Nunez 
and Fajnzylber and other papers in this literature. 
 
  III. Methodology  
In this paper, we will examine the effect of changes in legal minimum wages on the 
wages of workers in both the formal and several informal sectors in Costa Rica. 
As we indicated earlier, the original development models of dual sectors of Lewis (1954) 
and Harris and Todaro (1970) assumed that minimum wage laws were an important factor 
contributing to the wage differentials in the formal and informal sector and the urban and rural 
sectors.  Following the literature on economic dualism in developing economies, we present 
results for workers in the urban formal sector and for several different types of “informal” 
sectors.  The urban formal sector is defined as all employees in large urban firms plus all those 
urban workers with a university education or who are classified as professional or technical 
employees (no matter where they work). We classify all workers in rural areas as part of the   8
informal sector.  To identify the urban informal sector, we use the most common definition used 
in studies by the International Labor Office (ILO) and the U. N. Regional Employment Program 
for Latin America and the Caribbean (known by the its Spanish acronym PREALC).     
Specifically, we define the urban informal sector as those who work in firms with 5 or fewer 
employees who do not have a university education and are not classified as professional or 
technical employees.
7  We also divide the informal sector into those informal sector workers 
legally covered by minimum wages (the rural large-scale and small-scale enterprises and urban 
small firms) and the part of the informal sector not explicitly covered by minimum wages (self-
employed workers in rural and urban areas).  In summary, this breakdown leaves us with six 
sectors: the urban formal sector, three informal sectors where minimum wages are legally 
applicable to workers (the urban informal small firm sector, the rural large enterprise sector, the 
rural informal small enterprise sector) and two informal sectors where workers are not covered 
by minimum wages (urban self-employed and rural self-employed). 
  Our analysis of the impact of minimum wages on the wages of workers in the formal and 
informal sectors is based on two methods: first comparing the distribution of minimum wages 
and wages and then an econometric analysis of minimum wages changes and wage changes.  We 
begin by comparing kernel density functions of the wages of workers with kernel density 
functions of the distribution of minimum wages.  If minimum wages are having an effect, then 
we should see spikes in the wage distribution around the minimum wages. However, evidence of 
spikes cannot be interpreted as being caused by minimum wages since there are other possible 
reasons why minimum wages and actual wage spikes may coincide.  For example, both 
minimum wages and the wages reported by survey recipients may cluster at round numbers, 
wages may be standardized for sizeable trade or occupation groups, or actual wages and 
minimum wages may cluster around discrete levels of human capital.  To provide additional 
evidence of the impact of minimum wages on actual wages in each sector we estimate the extent 
to which changes in the minimum wage affect wages, holding constant other factors that might 
affect wages, by using individual-level pooled cross-section/time-series data (1988-1999).   
Specifically, we estimate separately for each sector an equation of the form: 
  it, t t
T
1 t
itj j
J
1 j it it it 1 o    it µ YR γ Σ OCC λ Σ δZ β X lnMW a α lnW + + + + ′ + + =
= =    (1) 
                                                 
7 Other ways besides firm size of identifying the informal sector are possible.  However, as Ranis and Stewart 
(1999) write “there is a strong correlation between smaller size enterprises and other criteria of informality” (p. 259).   9
where the dependent variable, lnWit, is the log of the real hourly wage (in 1999 colones) of 
individual  i at time t  (1988…1999). The explanatory variables include the log of the real 
minimum wage (in 1999 colones) that applies to that worker’s occupation category in each year, 
ln MWit.  The coefficient α1 is an estimate of the impact on average actual wages of changes in the 
legal minimum wage.  Other explanatory variables include the vector Xit, of individual specific 
human capital variables (years of education, a quadratic in experience, gender, and full 
interactions among these variables), and Zit, the value-added in the industry of the individual’s 
job in year t.
8  We also include dummy variables for each occupation categories, OCCitj (j = 
1…350), in order to control for occupation-specific fixed effects and for the endogenous 
correlation of wages and minimum wages across occupation categories.
9 Finally, to control for 
endogenous changes in yearly average minimum wages (as well as other year-specific factors 
such as aggregate supply and aggregate demand changes, the timing of minimum wage 
changes,
10 or design changes in the household surveys) we include a dummy variable for each 
year, YRt (t=1989-1999).  After including these two sets of dummy variables (for occupation and 
years), our resulting estimates of the impact of legal minimum wages on wages are based only on 
deviations of each minimum wage from the average minimum wage change within occupation 
categories over time.  We next argue that these changes can reasonably be thought of as 
exogenous.   
A major problem plaguing the empirical minimum wage literature is one of endogeneity 
bias that arises if minimum wages are set according to changes in demand and supply conditions, 
which also affect wages. This occurs, for example, when the level of minimum wages is adjusted 
by the amount of inflation in the previous period, a practice followed in Costa Rica and common 
in many countries. However, we argue that a special feature of Costa Rica’s minimum wage 
policy over this period assures us that we do not have a simultaneity problem in our estimations.  
During the period under study, the government of Costa Rica implemented a policy of gradually 
reducing the number of minimum wages from over 500 categories (set by the industry and 
occupation of the worker) in 1988 to 19 categories (set by skill only) in 1997.  The process of 
simplification made changes in the relative minimum wage within occupational categories 
exogenous over this period. The reason for this is that relative changes in minimum wages within 
                                                 
8 We use the ISIC at the one digit level.    
9 These occupation categories correspond, as best as we can make them, to the categories in the 1988 minimum 
wage legislation. 
10 Minimum wages were set typically in January and July of each year, but sometimes they were set a little earlier or 
later.  See Appendix Table A.1 for the exact timing minimum wage setting over this period.   10
occupations occurred solely in order to harmonize wages within an occupation category across 
industries. The Ministry identified broadly-defined occupation categories to be harmonized 
across industries and proceeded, gradually over a period of several years, to increase the 
lower(est) minimum wage by a greater amount than the higher(est) minimum wage within each 
broadly-defined occupational category. Over a period of several years, one minimum wage 
emerged for each broadly-defined occupation, irrespective of industry.  Effectively, this 
increased the amount of exogenous year-to-year variation in minimum wages because the 
minimum wages for different occupation categories in each year were increased by different 
amounts.   
Another source of exogenous variation in minimum wages was that, at the same time the 
industrial dimension of the minimum wage was being eliminated, the number of minimum wages 
for workers with higher education became more numerous.  In 1988, a minimum wage was set 
for all workers with a five-year university degree (licenciado), irrespective of occupation.  In 
1993 a new minimum wage was set for individuals with two to three years of university 
education (diplomados) and for graduates of five-year technical highs schools (técnicos).  In 
1997, another new minimum wage was added for workers with a four-year university degree.  
By 1997 there were 19 minimum wages, one each for unskilled workers, semi-skilled workers, 
skilled workers, specialized workers (supervisors) and domestic servants, and several for 
professionals (without any industrial dimension).
 11  
Appendix Table A.1 summarizes the changes in the level of minimum wages from 1987 
to 1999 and it is clear that there is a range of rate changes every six months. Whereas, an 
underlying criteria for setting wages was the rate of inflation (measured by the consumer price 
index) in the preceding six months, the minimum wage for each occupation/skill category were 
increased at different rates around this average and these rates did not depend on demand 
conditions for that specific occupation.
12 Therefore, we argue that after controlling for the 
average change in the minimum wage by year (which we do in the regressions with a set of year-
specific dummy variables), any remaining variation in legal minimum wages is exogenous to 
demand and supply conditions in the labor market, and therefore exogenous to actual wage 
                                                 
11 Our description of the process of simplification of  minimum wages in Costa Rica summarizes interviews with 
José Pablo Carvajal (Director, National Salaries Council,) July 14, 2003, Yabera Alvarado (Planning Directorate, 
Ministry of Labor,) July 15, 2003 and Pablo Sauma, July 9, 2003.  Ms. Alvarado is writing a detailed history of the 
minimum wage simplification project, which she hopes to publish in 2004. 
12 Interviews with José Pablo Carvajal (Director, National Salaries Council,) July 14 2003, Orlando Garcia 
(Planning Directorate, Ministry of Labor,) July 15 2003 and Pablo Sauma, July 9 2003.  Mr. Carvajal, who was part   11
changes.  This implies that our results will not suffer from endogeneity/simultaneity bias that 
exist in many studies which compare changes in a single minimum wage to changes in actual 
wages. 
 
IV. Data 
For our analysis we combine information on legal minimum wages from the decrees, 
published by the Ministry of Labor, with data on individuals from the annual Household Surveys 
for Multiple Purposes, carried out by the Costa Rican Institute of Statistics and Census.  The 
household surveys have been conducted in July of every year since 1976 on approximately 1% 
of the population. They include questions on earnings, employment, hours worked, job 
characteristics such as industry, occupation, sector and firm size, as well as education, age and 
many other personal characteristics of the individual in the household.  We create a cross-
section/time-series data set for all individuals who worked in the private sector.
13 In this paper 
we use only data from 1988 and later because it is only in these years that the occupation 
categories in the household surveys are sufficiently detailed to be able to adequately match with 
the detailed occupation /skill/industry categories in the minimum wage decrees.
14  We use data 
on an average of approximately 10,000 workers in each year for twelve years (1988-1999).  
Table 1 presents macroeconomic statistics on the mean real hourly wage and the mean 
real hourly minimum wage from the Costa Rican Household Surveys (weighted by the number 
of workers in each minimum wage category), the annual rates of GDP growth and inflation for 
each year from 1988 to 1999.  We point out that mean real wages closely follow macroeconomic 
conditions in Costa Rica, increasing in every year except for two recessions in 1990-91 and 
1995-96.  Real minimum wages do not vary as much as actual wages, and are not as closely tied 
to the business cycle.  We also note that the average real minimum wages are relatively stable 
from 1988 to 1994 and then increase each year from 1994 to 1999 (including the recession years 
of 1995-96).    
Figure 1 illustrates the structure of legal minimum wages in Costa Rica with histograms 
of the minimum wage distribution. Specifically, the figure presents the distribution of real 
                                                                                                                                                             
of the National Salaries Council for the entire period that we study, stated that inflation was the “only” factor 
considered in setting the average minimum wage increase. 
13 Public sector workers are excluded from the analysis since their wages are governed by a different set of decrees. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to match individual observations in the Costa Rican household surveys across years 
to create panel data.   12
minimum wages (in 1999 colons) among private sector workers who report positive earnings in 
1988 (at the beginning of the simplification process and the first year of data we use), 1993 (the 
middle year in our data set) and 1999 (at the end of the simplification process and the last year in 
our data set).  Spikes in the distribution of minimum wages represent legal minimum wages that 
apply to a large proportion of workers.  Starting from the left (the lowest minimum wage) in the 
1988 graphs, the first spike is at the minimum wage for domestic servants, who represent 
approximately 7% of all workers and to whom applies a legal minimum wage of 123 colones 
(1999 prices), or $0.43 (1999 U.S. dollars), per hour.  There are no minimum wages over a large 
range of possible wages between the minimum wage for domestic servants and the next 
minimum wage, which is around the minimum wage for unskilled workers (peones and other 
production workers) in most industries. The second spike (at 231 1999 colones or $0.81 per 
hour) represents over 20% of all workers in 1988.  Following this spike at the minimum wage for 
unskilled workers there is a cluster of many minimum wages that surround two smaller spikes at 
the minimum wages for operators of machinery (skilled workers) and specialized workers 
(supervisors) in most industries.  The applicable minimum wage for most Costa Rican workers is 
in this cluster. Finally, at the very right of the distribution of minimum wages (after numerous 
very small spikes) is a spike at the minimum wage for licenciados, who represent approximately 
2% of all workers with a legal minimum wage at 578 colones or $2.00 per hour.   
    A comparison of the graphs for 1988, 1993 and 1999 illustrates the changes in the 
structure of legal minimum wages.  The gradual simplification of minimum wages is shown 
clearly by the reduction in the number of minimum wages from 1988 to 1993, and then again 
from 1993 to 1999.  We can describe this simplification in more detail by focusing on comparing 
the last year for in our data set, 1999, with the first year, 1988.  As in 1988, the spike at the far 
left of the 1999 distribution of wages is at the minimum wage for domestic servants, which 
represent approximately 7% of workers.  As in 1988, the second spike occurs at the minimum 
wage for unskilled workers.  The simplification and consolidation process between 1988 and 
1999 compressed the distribution of minimum wages around the unskilled wage.  While in 1988 
the spike at the unskilled minimum wage represented 20% of workers, in 1999 the minimum 
wage for unskilled workers (at 279 colones or 0.96 dollars per hour) applies to 45% of workers.  
In addition, the number of minimum wages applicable to workers in Costa Rica has clearly been 
reduced.  At the same time that legal minimum wages for workers without higher education were 
                                                                                                                                                             
14  Although we use a 3-digit occupational classification, we present in appendix Table A.2 the two-digit 
occupational classification in the Household Survey.    13
being simplified and compressed, the addition of new minimum wage categories for workers 
with higher education resulted in several new spikes in the distribution of minimum wages at 
higher wage levels, including three noticeable spikes in the right-hand tail of the distribution at 
the minimum wages for workers with 2-4 years of university education (associates degrees), 4-
year university graduates and licenciados. 
  Table 2 presents some descriptive statistics on the average wages and distribution of 
workers in the six formal/informal sectors we define above. Over 50% of workers in Costa Rica 
live in rural areas, although the proportion of workers in rural areas declines over time.  This 
decline is especially pronounced for the rural large enterprise sector, which falls from almost 
28% of employees in 1988 to 24% in 1999.  At the same time, all urban sectors are growing, but 
especially the urban formal sector, which increases from 23% to over 26% of workers from 1988 
to 1999.     On average, 74% of workers are legally covered by minimum wage legislation, while 
26% are uncovered self-employed workers.   Average wages are highest for workers in the urban 
formal sector, followed closely by those of self-employed workers in urban areas.  Average 
wages are lowest for employees of small enterprises in urban and rural areas and for employees 
in the rural formal (large enterprise) sector.  These statistics suggest that, if legal minimum 
wages disproportionately affect the wages of low-wage workers, we would expect to find a 
bigger impact of minimum wages on the wages of workers in small enterprises and rural areas 
than in the urban formal sector.    
V. Findings 
Spikes in the distribution of wages 
  Figure 2 overlays the distribution of wages on the distribution of minimum wages for 
three years: 1988, 1993 and 1999 (similar graphs for all other years are presented in the 
appendix).  Several important points are immediately clear from observing these graphs.  First, 
legal minimum wages in Costa Rica are applicable to workers across the wage distribution; they 
are set for workers in each decile from the 3
rd to the 10
th.  However, in most years the majority of 
the minimum wages fall near the middle, in the 4
th to 6
th deciles of the distribution of wages.
15  
Second, there are a significant number of workers who earn below the minimum wage.   
                                                 
15Graphs of the distribution of the log of wages and the log of minimum wages for the covered and uncovered 
sectors for the other years for which we have data are presented in appendix Figure A1.  In some years the spikes in 
the distribution of minimum wages and actual wages are not as closely correlated as they are in 1988 and 1997, 
although in other years the correlations are even closer.   14
Minimum wages in Costa Rica clearly do not act as a wage floor for all workers.
16  Nevertheless, 
Figure 2 does present evidence that minimum wages affect the wages of some workers in Costa 
Rica as there are spikes in the distribution of wages at many of the same locations as the spikes 
in the distribution of minimum wages. In 1988 and 1993, there are two clear spikes in the 
distribution of wages that correspond to the minimum wages that apply to the largest proportion 
of workers: one at the level of minimum wages for unskilled workers and another at the level of 
minimum wages for unskilled/semi-skilled workers.  The distribution of hourly wages for 1999 
also exhibits two spikes near these two sets of minimum wages, although the matching is not as 
clear as for the other two years.  Further, in all three years there is a spike in the upper end of the 
distribution that corresponds to the legal minimum wage for licenciados. 
Figure 3 presents overlays of the distribution of minimum wages onto the distribution of 
actual hourly wages in 1993 for the urban formal sector and the five informal sectors defined 
previously.  (Similar graphs for 1988 and 1999 are presented in appendix Figures A2 and A3). 
To facilitate the comparison between sectors, we use the same x and y scales to draw the kernel 
density functions for each sector.  The urban formal sector has the smallest proportion of workers 
earning below the minimum wage, while the urban informal small firm and rural informal small 
enterprise sectors have the largest proportion of workers earning below the minimum wage. 
Nevertheless, an examination of the graphs presented in figure 3 also provides evidence that 
minimum wages do affect the wages of a paid employees in all covered sectors, but do not affect 
the wages of self-employed workers (the uncovered sector).  Again, if legal minimum wages 
affect the actual wages of workers, then spikes in the distribution of minimum wages should be 
reflected with similarly located spikes in the distribution of wages.  This appears to be the case in 
all sectors where workers are legally covered by minimum wages: the urban formal, rural formal, 
urban informal small firm, and rural informal small enterprise sectors.  Indeed, the spikes are 
                                                 
16 This results is consistent with a previous study examining enforcement of minimum wages in Costa Rica, 
Gindling and Terrell (1995) use 1976-1991 data to compare the proportions of workers earning below the legal 
minimum wage in the covered and uncovered sectors.  They find that over one-third of workers in Costa Rica earned 
less than the lowest minimum wage for the industry of their job in both the sector covered by minimum wage 
legislation and the uncovered sector.  Workers earning less than the minimum disproportionately are female, very 
young (less than 19 years old), very old (more than 60 years old), less educated, living in rural areas, and working in 
agriculture or personal services.  Gindling and Terrell (1995) speculate from the finding that the proportion of 
workers earning less than the minimum wage was the same in both the covered and uncovered sectors that minimum 
wages were not an important determinant of wages in the covered sector in Costa Rica. However, in our current 
paper, which uses econometric techniques on more recent and more detailed data that matches legal minimum wages 
to workers, we find that although minimum wages do not affect a large group at the bottom of the wage distribution, 
they do affect wages of approximately two-thirds of the workers who earn at or above the minimum wage for their 
occupation category.  
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more marked among workers in small firms than in the large firm sectors.  It is interesting to 
note that in both the rural and urban small firm sectors there is even a spike at the minimum 
wage for domestic servants.   On the other hand, Figure 3 also provides evidence that minimum 
wages do not affect the wages of self-employed workers (the uncovered sector) since there are 
no noticeable spikes in the distribution of self-employed earnings around the minimum wages.  
Thus, unlike Fajnzylber (2001), we find no evidence of a "lighthouse effect" on the wages of 
uncovered self-employed workers. 
Wage regression results 
  The coefficients on the minimum wage from the estimation of equation (1) for each 
sector are reported in Table 3.
17  They provide strong evidence that increases in the minimum 
wage cause an increase in the wages of workers in the urban formal and both the rural large and 
small firm sectors.  The coefficient on the minimum wage variable is significant at the 1% level 
in the equations for each of these sectors.  Among these sectors, the impact of minimum wages 
on average wages is lowest in the urban formal sector (0.103).   The impact of minimum wages 
on average wages is largest in the rural informal small enterprise sector (an elasticity of average 
wages to minimum wages of 0.396), followed by the rural large enterprise sector (0.164).  This is 
what we would expect if minimum wages are enforced similarly in all three sectors because there 
are more workers with wages near the minimum wage in the low-wage rural sectors.  There is 
weak evidence that minimum wages affect the wages of workers in the urban informal small firm 
sector.  The coefficient on the minimum wage variable in the urban informal small firm sector 
(0.149) is not significantly different from zero at the 10% level, but is significant at 12%.  We 
find no evidence that legal minimum wages affect the wages of workers in the two self-
employed (uncovered) sectors.  The coefficient on the minimum wage variable in the two 
equations for self-employed workers is not significantly different from zero for any reasonable 
level of significance. 
 
VI. Conclusions 
  The evidence presented in this paper suggests that, although legal minimum wages do not 
act as a wage floor for all workers in Costa Rica, legal minimum wages are enforced for many of 
the workers who are covered by the legislation, paid employees.  The evidence presented in this 
                                                 
17 The full set of coefficient estimates are reported in Table A3.  We do not interpret any of the coefficients on 
human capital since they are there only as control variables.   16
paper suggests that in Costa Rica minimum wages are enforced, and do affect the wages of 
workers, for all types of paid employees no matter whether they work in the traditionally-defined 
formal sector or in a sector that is traditionally considered to be informal.  Further, the estimated 
impact of changes in legal minimum wages on average wages is larger for workers in rural and 
small enterprises than in the urban large firm formal sector.   This suggests that, at least in Costa 
Rica, minimum wages do not cause labor market segmentation or dualism between the rural and 
urban sectors nor between large and small firms.  Rather, the evidence is consistent with the view 
that legal minimum wages affect workers in the covered sector and, within that, in sectors where 
more workers are likely to earn low wages, and therefore are more likely have market wages 
below the institutionally-determined minimum wages.  Thus, minimum wages may contribute to 
reducing the wage gap between the urban formal sector and the informal sectors.  Legal 
minimum wages cannot be enforced among self-employed workers (over 20% of workers in 
Costa Rica), and we find no evidence that minimum wages affect the wages of the self-employed 
either positively or negatively.  Thus, the evidence does provide support for the hypothesis that 
minimum wages may play a role in segmenting the labor market between employees and the 
self-employed.   17
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Table 1: Macroeconomic Statistics, Costa Rica 1988-1999
Mean Real Hourly Mean Real Hourly  Real GDP Inflation Rate
Minimum Wage
1 Wage
1 Growth (% change in CPI
Year (1999 CR colones) (1999 CR colones) Rate
2  July to July)
2
1988 248 359 3.4 20.7
1989 254 368 5.7 16.9
1990 249 360 3.6 19.8
1991 254 349 2.3 29.7
1992 263 351 7.7 21.1
1993 259 408 6.3 9.9
1994 249 434 4.9 11.8
1995 258 417 4.0 23.2
1996 282 401 0.3 18.7
1997 300 412 5.8 13.3
1998 309 430 8.0 11.7
1999 320 461 8.0 9.1
1 Source: Costa Rican Household Survey, using sample weights.
2 Source: the Costa Rican National Income Accounts.   
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Figure 1: The Distribution of Legal Minimum Wages in Costa Rica,  
1988, 1993 and 1999 
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Table 2: Distribution of Workers and Real Hourly Wages (1999 colones) by Sector
Sector
1988-1999 1988 1993 1999 1988-1999 1988 1993 1999
Covered Sectors
Urban Formal : 24.59 23.14 24.13 26.64 582 535 620 633
large enterprises    (660) (703) (797) (629)
Urban Informal 1:  7.46 7.78 7.12 8.83 310 274 333 334
small enterprises (323) (294) (431) (319)
Rural Informal 1:   26.77 27.75 29.08 24.07 368 348 362 445
large enterprise (423) (811) (280) (693)
Rural Informal 2: 15.2 15.92 14.99 14.78 254 210 269 396
small enterprises (250) (453) (281) (291)
Uncovered Sectors
Urban Informal 2: 10.03 9.48 9.85 11.09 561 471 537 640
self-employed (929) (494) (632) (1909)
Rural Informal 3: 15.94 15.94 14.83 14.59 428 363 440 491
self-employed (697) (484) (580) (824)
Real Hourly Wage (1999 Colones) Percent of Workers in Each Sector
Notes: Calculated with data from the Costa Rican Household Survey, using sample weights. Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Figure 2: Comparing the Distribution of Legal Minimum Wages to the  
Distribution of Hourly Wages, 1988, 1993 and 1999 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   23
 
l
o
g
 
w
a
g
e
Urban Formal Sector, 1993
Kernal Density Function
l
o
g
 
m
i
n
i
m
u
m
 
w
a
g
e
 log wage  log minimum wage
4 6 8
0
.05
.1
0
.388939
l
o
g
 
w
a
g
e
Rural Large Enterprise Sector, 1993
Kernal Density Function
l
o
g
 
m
i
n
i
m
u
m
 
w
a
g
e
 log wage  log minimum wage
4 6 8
0
.05
.1
0
.388939
l
o
g
w
a
g
e
Urban Informal (small) Sector, 1993
Kernal Density Function
l
o
g
 
m
i
n
i
m
u
m
 
w
a
g
e
 logwage  log minimum wage
4 6 8
0
.05
.1
0
.388939
l
o
g
w
a
g
e
Rural Informal (small)Sector, 1993
Kernal Density Function
l
o
g
 
m
i
n
i
m
u
m
 
w
a
g
e
 logwage  log minimum wage
4 6 8
0
.05
.1
0
.388939
 
l
o
g
w
a
g
e
Urban Self-employed, 1993
Kernal Density Function
l
o
g
 
m
i
n
i
m
u
m
 
w
a
g
e
 logwage  log minimum wage
4 6 8
0
.05
.1
0
.388939
l
o
g
w
a
g
e
Rural Self-employed, 1993
Kernal Density Function
l
o
g
 
m
i
n
i
m
u
m
 
w
a
g
e
 logwage  log minimum wage
4 6 8
0
.05
.1
0
.388939
 
 
Figure 3: Comparing the Distribution of Legal Minimum Wages to the  
Distribution of Hourly Wages, by Sector 1993   24
 
B SE N R-squared
Covered Sectors
Urban Formal : 0.103
a 0.031 20,240 0.4354
large enterprises   
Urban Informal 1:  0.149 0.096 7,211 0.2008
small enterprises
Rural Informal 1:   0.164
a 0.038 33,538 0.3515
large enterprise
Rural Informal 2: 0.396
a 0.111 20,300 0.1832
small enterprises
Uncovered Sectors
Urban Informal 2: 0.193 0.145 9,560 0.1393
self-employed
Rural Informal 3: -0.047 0.138 21,775 0.1551
self-employed
a = significant at 1%
b = significant at 5%
Notes:
1The data used in all regressions are weighted using the sample weights.  Explanatory 
variables in the regressions also include: dummy variables for each year, dummy 
variables for each industry, occupation and skill category in the minimum wage legislation, 
value-added by industry, and several individual-level variables including years of 
education, potential experience, experience squared, experience cubed and gender along 
with full interactions among these individual-level variables and the year dummies. See 
Table A2 for full results. 
2Reported significance levels are based on estimates of the standard errors that are 
robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation and are corrected for clustering caused 
by including both micro-level data and a more aggregated variable (the minimum wage 
variable) in the regressions.
Table 3: Estimating the Effects of Minimum Wages on Wages, by Sector
(Dependent Variable: Log of Hourly Wage)
Coefficient on the Log of Real Minimum Wage
(elasticity of wage to minimum wage)
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M.W. From To Raise  
1987
 M.W.  From To Raise  
January 1 - August 29 ¢0.00 ¢267.00 9.00%  
¢267.05 ¢307.80 7.50%
¢307.85 ¢344.50 5.50%
More than ¢344.5 3.50%
August 30 - December 31 ¢312.80 ¢0.00 4.00%  
¢312.85 ¢322.90 3.00%
More than ¢322.95 2.50%
1988
January 1 - August 15
August 16 - December 31
1989
January 1 - September 16
 September 17 - December 31
1990
January 1 - July 31
August 1 - December 31
1991
January 1 - June 23
June 23 - December 31
1992
January 1 - July 1
July 2 - December 31
1993
January 1 - July 26
July 27 - December 31
1994
January 1 - July 30 Increases of 8.00% Agriculture
9.00% Other Activities
July 31 - December 31 9.00% Unskilled ag. labor in Palm Oil
10.00% Bus Drivers 
42.86% "Coyol" harvesters
8.00% All other activities 
Over 500 different minimum wage categories within 10 major industry 
categories (agriculture, mining, manufacturing, construction, electricity, 
commerce, transportation, communications, services, and professionals.) The 
professional category includes a minimum wage for anyone with a 
"licenciado," a 5-year university degree (more common that a 4-year 
bachelors degree.) The other professional minimum wages are for specific 
professions (and not for anyone with a 2-year or 4-year degree).
Several categories are added for those with higher education.   In addition to 
the already existing minimum wage for "licenciados," legal minimum wages 
are now set for those with 2-3 years of university education ("diplomados" or 
"tecnicos") and for graduates of 5-year technical high schools.
Increases from 5.03% to 17.3%.  Average increase was 10.51%
Table A1:  Summary of Changes in Legal Minimum Wages, Costa Rica 1987 - 1999
As part of the process of gradually consolidating minimum wage categories, 
for each category minimum wages were increased by different absolute 
amounts: the range is 3.5-15.0%.  The average increase was 11.0%
Increases of 8.85% for the lowest salaries down to 2.3% for the highest 
salaries, with exception for domestic servants (9.16%).  Average increase 
5.64%.
Increases from 2.11% to 15.67%.  Average increase was 9.86%.
Increases from 3.41% to 8.88%.  Average increase was 6.41%
Increases from 4.76% to 16.81%.  Average increase was 12.16%.
Increases from 3.14% to 25.29%.  Average increase was 9.91%.
Increases from 4% to 26.69%.  Average increase was 11.38%.
Increases from 9.79% to 16.35%.  Average increase was 13.47%
The major industry categories of manufacturing, mining, electricity and 
construction were combined.  The number of minimum wage categories is 
reduced to 60-70. Consolidation of categories continues.
Beginning in 1988 the Ministry of Labor began a gradual process of reducing 
the number of minimum wage categories.  To do this, the Ministry identified 
two or more categories that were to be combined and increased the minimum 
wage in the category with the lowest minimum wage by a greater amount than 
the minimum wage in the higher wage category.  In this way, over a period of 
several years, the minimum wage for these categories would become the 
same. Therefore, for each category in each year minimum wages are 
increased by different amounts.
Increases of
Increases from 4.88% to 14.58%.  Average increase was 5.07%.
Increases from 4.65% to 6.37%.  Average increase was 5.02%
Increases from 12.02% to 13.89%.  Average increase was 13.73%.  
Exceptions: Domestic Servants, 18.72%, Private Accountants, 37.38% and 
Journalists, 39.58%.
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1995
January 1 - August 9 Increases of 5.71% "Coyol" harvesters
10.00% all other activities 
August 10 - December 31
1996
January 1 - July 4
July 5 - December 31
1997
January 1 - July 4
July 5 - December 31
1998
January 1 - June 30
July 1 - December 31
1999
January 1 - June 30
July 1 - December 31
Sources: Ministry of Labor and Social Security, National Salary Council, Department of Salaries,
and interviews with Jose Pablo Carvajal (Director, National Salary Council), July 14, 2003 
and Orlando Garcia (Planning Directorate, Ministry of Labor), July 15, 2003.
Increases from 4.57% to 4.59%.  Average increase was 4.58%
Increases from 7.00% to 7.14%.  Average increase was 7.02%.
Increases from 6.52% to 6.67%.  Average increase was 6.52%
The major industry categories were combined into one that specifically 
includes agriculture, mining, manufacturing, construction, commerce, tourism, 
services, transport, and warehousing.  Within this combined category four 
minimum wages are set, for unskilled workers, semi-skilled workers, skilled 
workers and specialized workers (supervisors.)   Two other major categories 
remained: professionals and "specials."  "Specials" included a minimum wage 
for domestic servants.  Within the professionals category a minimum wage 
was added for workers with a 4-year university degree.  These changes 
resulted in only 19 different minimum wages being set in 1997.    
Increases from 6.49% to 6.58%.  Average increase was 6.43%.
Increases from 38.08% to 17.78%.  Average increase was 8.35%.
Increases from 8.54% to 7.95%.  Average increase was 8.05%
Increases from 5.70% to 12.83%.  Average increase was 9.69%
Increases from 38.08% to 17.78%.  Average increase was 8.35%.
Increases from 8.54% to 7.95%.  Average increase was 8.05%
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Table A2: Occupation Codes used by the Costa Rica’s National Statistic and Census Institute for  
the Multi-purpose Housing Surveys, from 1987 to 2000. 
 
 
Groups Description 
0  Professionals and technicians 
00  Professionals and technicians in: architecture, urbanism, technical drawing, engineering 
and industrial engineering technology.   
01  Professionals and technicians in: chemistry, physic, astronomy, geology, bacteriology and 
industrial laboratories. 
02  Professionals and technicians in: agronomy and veterinary medicine, biology, natural 
sciences, and agricultural technology. 
03  Professionals and technicians in: medicine, surgery, dentistry, pharmacy, medic 
technology, and paramedic and health activities.   
04  Professionals and technicians in: arts, literature, sports, recreation, communication, 
advertising, organization and social welfare. 
05  Professionals and technicians in: religious and cult activities.   
06  Professionals and technicians in: teaching and research. 
07  Professionals and technicians in: mathematics and statistics, economics, business, 
accounting and social sciences.    
08  Professionals and technicians in: law and jurisprudence.  
09  Professionals and technicians in: maritime, fluvial and air transport and communications. 
1  Directors and general managers 
10  Directors and senior managers in the public administration (executive, legislative and 
judicial powers). 
11  Directors and managers in government institutions with total or partial administrative 
independency and private enterprises: in agricultural and industrial production and trade.  
12  Directors and general managers in government institutions with total or partial 
administrative independency and private enterprises in the service industries.  
2  Office clerks in the government and private enterprises 
20  Office clerks and financial accountant employees in the government (central, regional, 
local levels) and private enterprises.  
21  Accounting and budget employees.  
22  Employees in secretarial activities and transcription and reproduction of texts. 
23  Operators of computers and accounting equipments.  
24  Employees in supervision, delivery and control of transport and communication services.  
25  Employees in mail and message distribution 
26  Employees in the operation of radiotelephony, radiotelegraphy, and telecommunication 
equipment. 
27  Administrative employees in other services.  
3  Traders, retailers, wholesalers and salespersons 
30  Retailers and wholesalers. 
31  Retail salespersons and salesmen on the streets.  
32  Sale representatives – wholesale and manufacturing. 
33  Other salespersons and sale agents,  traders and commission agents 
4  Crop and animal farmers, and agricultural workers. 
40 Agricultural  Overseers 
41  Crop and animal farmers (owners) 
42 Agricultural  workers 
43 Fishers 
44  Hunters and other workers in hunting.   28
45 Forestry  workers 
5  Occupations related to driving, operating and controlling of transportation 
vehicles. 
50  Drivers of terrestrial transport vehicles. 
51  Railway conductor and stokers. 
52  Conductors and crew of ships and others.   
53  Operators of equipment of transit signals and controls. 
6  Occupations in craft and manufacturing production of textiles and clothing. 
Also, occupations in carpentry, bricklaying, painting, plumbing, mechanic, 
and electricity. 
60 Textile  workers. 
61  Clothing production workers (except footwear, leather articles and related goods). 
62  Shoemakers, saddlers and related footwear workers 
63 Carpenters,  cabinetmakers  and related wood workers.  
64  Bricklayers, ceiling installers and other construction workers. 
65  Painters of construction, vehicles, machinery, etc. (except painters and decorators of glass 
and ceramic).  
66  Plumbers or other installers of pipes and metallic structures and welders in general.  
67  Electricians. Operators and repairers of electric and electronic installations and equipment. 
68  Mechanics and repairers of machinery in different sectors: agriculture, manufacture, 
construction and transport.  
69 Watchmakers, opticians, mechanics of precision; jewelers, silversmiths and related 
workers of jewels and objects made of precious metals. 
7  Occupations in craft and manufacturing production in graphic, chemical, mining, 
metal smelting, food product and beverage, ceramic, leather, tobacco and other 
product industries. 
70  Crafts persons and operators of graphic machines.  
71  Miners, mining stonecutters, and operators of mining extraction machinery  
72  Smelters, rolling mill operators and workers related to metal treatments.   
73  Ceramists, potters and glass object producers. 
74  Workers and operators of machinery in chemical, wood, paperboard and corrugated paper 
industries. 
75  Workers and operators of machinery in food product and beverage industries. 
76  Workers in tobacco transformation and cigarette production.  
77  Workers in tanneries and workers related to transformation of skins and leathers. 
78  Other crafts persons and machine operators. 
8  Occupations in packing, loading, and storage 
80  Workers in packing, loading and storage 
9  Personal services and related services. 
90  Workers in vigilance, protection and security.  
91  Cooks, maids, cleaners and occupations in food and beverage service.  
92  Workers in laundry and ironing. 
93  Doormen and building cleaners and managers.  
94 Estheticians 
95  Other workers in personal services. 
98  People working in unidentified occupations. 
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Ln Min. Wage 0.103
a 0.149 0.164
a 0.396
a 0.193 -0.047
(0.031) (0.096) (0.038) (0.111) (0.145) (0.138)
Schooling 0.044
a 0.083
a 0.039
a 0.062
a 0.010 0.045
b
(0.005) (0.010) (0.005) (0.010) (0.024) (0.019)
Experience 0.019
b 0.071
a 0.016
a 0.051
a -0.019 0.022
(0.009) (0.011) (0.007) (0.010) (0.023) (0.015)
Experience
2 0.000 -0.001
a 0.000 -0.001
a 0.001 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Experience
3 2.78e-06 9.07e-06
b -3.26e-06 4.08e-06 -6.31e-06 1.17e-06
(4.04e-06) (3.71e-06) (3.78e-06) (3.58e-06) (0.000) (3.93e-06)
Gender -0.057 0.038 0.026 0.195
b -0.499
a -0.176
(0.052) (0.088) (0.048) (0.085) (0.176) (0.127)
School • Exp. 0.001
c -0.004
a 0.001
b -0.001 0.002 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
School • Exp
2 0.000
b 0.000 0.000
a 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
School • Exp
3 6.97e-07
b -1.94e-07 1.21e-06
a 9.46e-07
b 6.29e-07 5.10e-07
(2.91e-07) (5.81e-07) (2.91e-07) (4.23e-07) (6.20e-07) (5.15e-07)
Exp • Gender 0.007 0.008 0.017
a 0.003 0.029
c 0.012
(0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.008) (0.017) (0.011)
Exp
2 • Gender 0.000 0.000 -0.001
b 0.000 -0.001 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Exp
3 • Gender -2.57e-06 2.93e-06 5.48e-06 1.18e-06 4.87e-06 4.55e-07
(3.31e-06) (3.56e-06) (3.57e-06) (3.18e-06) (5.54e-06) (3.54e-06)
School • Gender 0.005 0.004 -0.003 -0.013
b 0.060
c 0.077
(0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.010) (0.008)
YR 88 -0.039 -0.038
a -0.003 0.078
c
(0.051) (0.015) (0.034) (0.045)
YR 89 0.015 0.013 -0.022 0.108 0.152
a
(0.022) (0.045) (0.030) (0.068) (0.049)
YR 90 0.022 -0.002 -0.037
c 0.055
c -0.004
(0.022) (0.047) (0.020) (0.033) (0.043)
YR 91 -0.039 -0.092
b -0.015 0.022 -0.003 -0.009
(0.024) (0.043) (0.016) (0.037) (0.045) (0.052)
YR 92 -0.021 -0.056
a -0.022 -0.015
(0.022) (0.015) (0.040) (0.040)
YR 93 0.076
a 0.114
a 0.043
b 0.157
a 0.106
a 0.168
a
(0.025) (0.046) (0.018) (0.029) (0.037) (0.041)
YR 94 0.122
a 0.115
a 0.047
a 0.127
a 0.192
a 0.157
a
(0.024) (0.042) (0.015) (0.030) (0.055) (0.053)
YR 95 0.086
a 0.125
b 0.046
a 0.145
a 0.148
a 0.140
a
(0.023) (0.052) (0.016) (0.028) (0.046) (0.048)
YR 96 0.050
c 0.107
a -0.024
c 0.099
a 0.141
a 0.070
(0.027) (0.042) (0.014) (0.034) (0.049) (0.048)
YR 97 0.044
c 0.074
c 0.002 0.024 0.098
b 0.171
a
(0.024) (0.043) (0.016) (0.033) (0.048) (0.051)
YR 98 0.093
a 0.147
a 0.029
c 0.141
a 0.119
b 0.191
a
(0.025) (0.046) (0.016) (0.027) (0.050) (0.058)
YR 99 0.103
a 0.141
a 0.066
a 0.163
a 0.029 0.173
a
(0.025) (0.044) (0.016) (0.029) (0.050) (0.058)
Sectorial Value added -6.60e-08
c -1.39e-07 1.23e-08 7.08e-08 1.36e-07 2.89e-08
(3.93e-08) (1.16e-07) (3.41e-08) (6.80e-08) (1.21e-07) (1.28e-07)
Constant 4.171 4.171 4.617 1.449 4.666 5.833
(0.557) (0.557) (0.827) (0.635) (0.334) (0.782)
No of Observations 20240 7211 33538 20300 9560 21775
No. of Clusters 2415 972 2231 1129 1122 1195
R
2 0.435 0.201 0.352 0.183 0.139 0.155
a = significant at 1%; b = significant at 5%.
Table A3: OLS Regressions, Dependent Variable: Ln wage
Informal Sector Formal
Urban      
Self-Emp.
Rural      
Self-Emp.
Urban    
Large Scale
Urban    
Small Scale
Rural    
Large Scale
Rural    
Small Scale  30
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Figure A1: Comparing the Distribution of Legal Minimum Wages to the  
Distribution of Hourly Wages, 1988-1999 
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Figure A2: Comparing the Distribution of Legal Minimum Wages to the  
Distribution of Hourly Wages, by Sector 1988   32
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Figure A3: Comparing the Distribution of Legal Minimum Wages to the  
Distribution of Hourly Wages, by Sector 1999 
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